For a generation, at least, Black children have been scandalously overrepresented in public school classes intended for mildly retarded individuals. But identifying exactly what makes this a scandal and whom we should blame is not so obvious. Are we scandalized because the grounds for the disparate assignment of Black and White children to such classes are erroneous or because they are correct? Assuming that these disproportionate placements are erroneous, as it is generally assumed, at whom should the finger of wrongdoing be pointed: Testers? Teachers? School "systems"? Families? The children themselves? School boards? Legislatures? The courts? And who has the power and responsibility to right the wrong?
I. One Illustrative Case
In order to particularize my discussion, I will center my analysis on one famous case. Larry P. v. Riles 1 was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in 1971. The most recent action in this case (under the name of Crawford v. Honig) came in the form of a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 1994. 2 The case was brought by Larry P. and other "named plaintiff was relying on a wide variety of legal arguments under the state and federal constitutions and under federal statutes. Judge Peckham found in favor of the plaintiff on all of these legal grounds. On appeal, his decision was expressly affirmed by the Ninth Circuit only on the federal statutory grounds.
II. The Educational Framework
For a student such as Larry P., who has no known medical problem and no evident physical or mental disability, special education begins with in-school failure. As a classroom teacher focuses attention on a student who is consistently performing at a level noticably below her or his classmates, at some point a decision is made about whether to refer the student for special education evaluation. At that point, for various reasons, a decision may be made not to refer. A decision to refer will mean a decision to evaluate the student, which at the time of Larry P. would have entailed testing with a parent's consent and evaluation of the student's "adaptive behavior." If the student were tested, a determination that the student's scores fell below an established level (which, at the time of Larry P., was 70 on a standard IQ test, two standard deviations below the mean-a level that should identify the lowest 10% of scores) would make the student "eligible" for placement in a special education class for children of low school ability. A score below that line would not automatically lead to such a placement, but such a placement would be barred by a score above that level. 4 Under current federal law, a determination that a child needs special education leads to a process for creating and the creation of an individual education program, which is supposed to be designed to meet the individual child's educational needs. In theory, this process should lead not simply to placement in some broadly appropriate special education program but to a finely tuned educational solution under which each child is given just those things that will enable the child to achieve her or his optimum potential-resources, personnel, methodology, curriculum, atmosphere, incentive, motivation. There are many reasons why this ideal solution is not attained. The resources available are inadequate. The educators with the knowledge and ability to provide the needed education are not available. The knowledge of the educational program or approach needed to offset the student's educational shortfall has not been discovered. The analysis of the student's educational need is flawed. School, home, or societal environment undermine the student's efforts. The student lacks the motivation necessary to take advantage of the educational opportunity provided.
It is important to repeat and stress the fact that the process of identifying the special education needs of a child such as Larry P. begins with a determination of in-school academic failure in regular classes and that the process is multistaged. At each stage of the process, evaluations and judgments are made, all of which may be subject to question. When intelligence testing is part of the process, as it was in the case of Larry P., additional questions are raised. Initially, there is a question of just what is being tested-whether "intelligence," as understood for purposes of such tests, is a characteristic of intellectual ability distinct from acquired knowledge and experience. However it is conceptualized, there is a distinct question of whether the quality being tested can be measured accurately-at all or for some individuals or groups. If it can be measured accurately, there is nevertheless a question of whether the measured quality helps to provide a basis for designing a relevant and responsive educational program. Questions about the meaning, accuracy, and utility of intelligence tests are compounded by their racial effects-which they are well known to have generally and did have specifically in the Larry P. case. These combined questions about testing and race are compounded when the test is used for a special education placement such as EMR. The value of EMR classes for any student has been debatable, but, for students erroneously placed in these classes because of a misclassification, EMR classes are unambiguously detrimental.
III. From School to Court
As described previously, a student placed in an EMR class would have been given that placement at the end of a long, multistep process. But the end of a process of educational evaluation and corresponding educational placement for the student may mark the beginning of the student's involvement with the judicial process. If the student (or, more likely, the student's parent) feels aggrieved by the classification and placement or by the resulting education provided, the student (through the parent) may seek relief in court.
People come to court when they have given up on obtaining what they want in other ways. They think of the court as a place that will right a wrong, and they go to court when they feel wronged. A Black student assigned to an EMR class might feel aggrieved in several ways. She might feel aggrieved by having been labeled as "retarded." She might feel aggrieved by having been treated in an unfair way by reason of her race. Most basically, though, she is likely to feel aggrieved by reason of having been erroneously assigned to educationally inappropriate and inferior classes: She needs educational help that the EMR placement will not provide; she wants educational opportunity that the EMR placement denies. For the student, the court is being asked to do justice; for society, the court is being asked to solve a difficult problem of public policy.
IV. Transforming an Educational Issue Into a Legal Issue
The student who believes herself wrongly placed educationally might straightforwardly ask the court for a correction: The educational decision makers made an erroneous educational decision; now the court should correct them with an appropriate educational decision. Under this conception of the judicial process, the court is an undifferentiated decision maker and simply acts at a higher level of authority. The court will not think of itself in this way, however. The court will not think of itself as making an educational decision to resolve an educational issue. In the usual case, if the court understands that it is being asked for a "better" educational decision, the response, as a practical matter, would be no independent judicial decision but simply deference to the expertise and prerogative of the educational decision makers. To elicit a more activist judicial role, the educational issue will have to be presented as a legal issue for which the court can give a legal answer.
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In connection with the alleged wrongful placement of Black children in EMR classes in the Larry P. case, the student plaintiffs objection to an erroneous educational placement was transposed into several legal questions. This conceptual transformation of the educational wrong into a legal claim actually takes place in the lawyer's office. It is the lawyer who hears the student's grievance and frames the student's case in terms that fit a legal category that the lawyer believes will be more likely to receive a favorable judicial response. From the beginning of the Larry P. case, the court's primary attention was directed to the legal allegation of race discrimination, and this allegation was considered by the court under several legal categories. 6 So, to fit the square educational grievance into a round legal hole, Larry P., who feels aggrieved by an erroneous educational placement, alleges, in effect, that he has been legally wronged under statutes and the Constitution of the United States because he was given an educational placement on the basis of his race. Constitutionally speaking, the case draws on the basic rule of law under which the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits government actors such as school officials from discriminating on the basis of race. Legally, the student is saying, "I have been put in the wrong educational placement because of my race" (and, correspondingly, "I would be placed in the correct educational setting and program if I were not Black" and also, "I would not complain of this educational placement if White children were placed there on the same basis as I"). Once the issue receives this legal stamp, it takes on a legal life of its own.
Factually, this legal framing means that the only truths that matter are those based on evidence that gets in the "record" in court through legally prescribed manners of proof, and, even within those restrictions, what eventually represents truth is what the courts find believable. Evidence about education and testing, as it becomes legal evidence, often sounds like the same evidence that educational and testing experts and decision makers consider. But the court hears this evidence through the filters of burdens of proof and legal formulas.
Furthermore, when the plaintiffs educational grievance is transformed into a legal issue, it enters into an arcane world of law. That does not mean that the law is settled, but only that the answer to the student's petition will be determined through a process of thinking and deciding that is peculiar to the law. In identifying and applying the legal rule that governs a particular issue, courts act within constraints and also with considerable discretion. In this law-determining process, courts are not filling in numbers in a mathematical formula, but neither are they 5 Even when the legal issue is framed in terms that seem expressly to require the court to answer an educational question, the court is very likely to convert the educational question into a quite different legal question. For example, in Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982) , the controlling statute directed the court to decide, on the "preponderance of the evidence," whether a student had been given an "appropriate" education. The U.S. Supreme Court stressed the institutional limits of the judiciary and told the lower courts to restrict their actions to determining whether the educational decision makers had a reasonable basis for believing their assignment would be somewhat beneficial and had acted in a procedurally correct manner. freely choosing what they think is good and right. It is a dynamic process, but the terms of the dynamism are the law's terms.
In this legal world, what it takes to establish the plaintiffs case may surprise the student who, to conform to the law's demands, frames her educational complaint in discrimination terms. The claim of discrimination seems straightforward: Intelligence tests were used by California to place the student in an EMR class; a substantially larger percentage of Black children than White children fall below the cut-off point on the test; as a Black student, the plaintiff was treated disadvantageous^ compared to White students through this placement process. Now, one might think that this discriminatory effect is a form of discrimination prohibited by the equal protection clause. That is not an unreasonable supposition; it was thought to describe the governing rule of constitutional law at one time. Judge Peckham's opinion on which his preliminary injunction in the Larry P. case was based assumed that discriminatory effect made out a prima facie case of unconstitutional discrimination. In his Larry P. opinion that provided the basis for making that injunction permanent, he devoted five pages to a discussion of the way constitutional law had changed since his earlier decision. Under the current rule governing constitutional law, a valid equal protection claim depends on a court's determination that the race discrimination was purposeful. For a claim of racial discrimination by intelligence testing, purposeful discrimination would mean either that the intelligence test was selected because it could be predicted to produce a racially discriminatory effect or that the test was administered in a manner intended to cause discrimination on the basis of race.
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In either respect, the purpose is not ordinarily established through some direct evidence showing subjective intent to discriminate because that evidence is usually not available. A racially discriminatory purpose is ordinarily established, indirectly, through evidence that would lead a reasonable person to draw an inference that the wrongful purpose must have been present. Once again, one might wonder whether it would be enough to show evidence that the discriminatory effect was contemplated by the test adopter or applyer, and the answer is, "ordinarily, no." As Judge Peckham's Larry P. opinion explains, there is a tort law principle under which one is regarded as intending the natural and foreseeable consequences of one's acts. That principle might have been adopted as an interpretation of the equal protection clause, but the Supreme Court has said that that principle does not apply. Rather, the Court has said, what is required is that the action challenged must have been taken because of its discriminatory effect, not simply despite that effect.
Exactly what it takes to convince the fact finder of this "because" in a judicial proceeding dealing with intelligence testing is not easy to state succinctly. Judge Peckham spent several pages of his Larry P. opinion trying to explain, in general terms, how constitutional doctrine required this decision to be made, and the bulk of his decision explained how these general requirements were applied to the facts and issues before him.
Application of Equal Protection Doctrine to the Larry P. Facts
Judge Peckham's conclusion that the racially disproportionate EMR placements resulted from purposeful race discrimination is woven out of two main strands: the circumstances of the selection by California officials of the particular intelligence tests to be used as a part of the EMR classification process and the knowing use of intelligence tests for an EMR-placement purpose without separate validation of the tests for this purpose for Black children.
Judge Peckham pointed out that the tests were selected by officials in the State Department of Education "extremely quickly and unsystematically"; that the person in charge of the selection was not an expert in intelligence testing; that, despite the fact that these matters had come into the public policy discussion in California, no special consideration was given to the test's disproportionate racial impact or possible cultural bias; that independent testing experts were not consulted; and that the request of the "field personnel" to slow down the selection process was ignored. Furthermore, the court noted that an apparent gender bias had been eliminated by standardizing the tests for boys and girls, but no such comparable action had been considered for Black and White children. Assessing this boy-girl/Black-White contrast in strong terms, Judge Peckham concluded that responsible officials acquiesced in the racially disparate impact of the tests used because, "in effect," the officials assumed that "black children were less 'intelligent' than whites."
It is far from clear that this evidence suffices to meet the legal requirement that the government action (here the selection of the tests) was taken "because of" its racially disparate effect, and not merely "despite" that effect. Assuming that the evidence does satisfy the legal requirement, the legal standard, as applied here, seems capricious from the point of view of educational policy. In one sense, that is so because variation from case to case might depend more on what was provable in court than on what was actually true concerning the circumstances of adopting the particular intelligence tests. More important, though, it seems implausible that the single variable (the circumstances of test adoption) would be a dependable proxy for determining the quality and suitability of the education provided as a consequence of test performance. In another case, in which the same tests were selected with the same disparate result but under circumstances other than those that support a finding of wrongful purpose in the selection process, the plaintiff would feel educationally aggrieved but would not have made her legal case-and the disproportionate racial enrollments in the EMR class would stand. Similarly, the selection of other tests with comparable results, but absent any suspicious circumstances, would be legally permissible.
In fact, nothing in Judge Peckham's opinion explains why selecting these particular intelligence tests was especially objectionable. It was presumably because of their predictable racial impact, but Judge Peckham plainly recognized that there is a predictable Black-White disparity of result on all standardized tests. Therefore, it would seem that his objection was to choosing any such tests, even though the law in California assumed that such tests would be used. Judge Peckham emphasized the fact that California legislation had also expressed concern about disparate placements along racial lines and about the cultural bias of standardized intelligence tests. Evidently, his basic criticism (and the basis of his wrongful-purpose finding) was the administrative decision to go forward with the mandated testing program in seeming disregard of these concerns.
That brings us to the other main strand from which the court constructed its legal determination of purposeful discrimination. Judge Peckham attached great significance to the gross overrepresentation of Black children in the EMR category. He said, "There is less than a one in a million chance that the overenrollment of black children... in the E.M.R. classes would have resulted in a color-blind system of placement" and the ratio would fall only to 1 in 100,000 "if it is assumed that black children have a 50 percent greater incidence of this type of mental retardation."
8 These are powerful numbers and they undoubtedly were powerful to Judge Peckham. Throughout his opinion, there is a refrain that says, in effect, that it would take some very strong showing to convince him that these numbers resulted without a deliberate attempt to discriminate against Black children. This gross disproportion of EMR placements was always juxtaposed with the use of intelligence tests in the Larry P. case, because the disproportionate impact of the tests was acknowledged by all. Although the test results did not automatically or singly account for the disproportionate EMR placements, the tests clearly played a role in the placement process, and Judge Peckham concluded that the role dominated all other factors. For all practical purposes, Judge Peckham treated the disproportion of EMR placement and of test results as interchangable.
Once again, there is a question of whether the predictable effect of the numbers is enough under the controlling equal protection test to establish that the particular intelligence tests were used with the purpose to cause disproportionate EMR enrollments.
9 Evidently Judge Peckham thought it did in the absence of proof that the test scores provided a valid basis for determining whether Black children should be classified as EMR. In search of such proof, the court explored a number of alternatives, 10 but two considerations seemed to carry special weight with the court. One of these was based on a comparison and contrast with the use of testing in the employment area. The court said that it was appropriate to deny employment to an applicant whose test score accurately predicted poor on-the-job performance. In sharp contrast, it was not acceptable to deny a student educational opportunity on the basis of test results that accurately predict poor school performance. Of 8 495 F. Supp. at 944.
9
In determining whether purposeful discrimination has been established, the disparate effect is one relevant factor, and the greater the statistical disparity, the stronger the inference from that factor. See cases cited supra note 7. See also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (in rare cases statistical disparity will dictate a conclusion of purposeful discrimination); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (same).
10
(1) The court rejected a genetic explanation on the ground that there was no evidence to support that theory (and noted that the defendants did not claim otherwise). (2) It rejected defendants' argument that socioeconomic factors associated with poor nutrition could cause an increase in mental retardation on the grounds that the necessary level of poverty to have such an impact did not exist in the United States and that there was no elevated ratio of Black children who were more severely retarded (and in the lower "trainable" mentally retarded category). (3) The court rejected the argument that the tests were in fact valid predictors of EMR status for Black children on various grounds. In general, predicting poor in-school performance was meaningless because the students were already exhibiting poor in-school performance at the time they were tested. Moreover, basing the accuracy of prediction on performance in EMR classes was merely using the tests as a self-fulfilling prophesy, because the reduced educational opportunities of the EMR classes would make the student less and less qualified to gain benefit from the regular curriculum.
course, this line of reasoning by the court makes sense as a matter of educational policy if the EMR program is worthless to the student affected. But that judgment can be based on only one of two reasons, and neither fits the legal framework of the case. One possible reason is that the student is being wrongly classified-but the court cannot use that reason because that is precisely what is at issue under the governing legal rule: Unconstitutional race discrimination is involved if the discriminatory effect of EMR assignments is purposefully caused, purposeful discrimination is arguably shown by numerical disproportion that does not result from validated testing, but the testing is not invalid if it accurately predicts which children cannot benefit from regular education. The alternative reason is that the EMR program is worthless for every student-but the court cannot use that reason because that is not part of the legal issue to be decided. So, this may be an occasion on which, knowingly or not, the court ignores the constraints of the applicable legal theory and acts on the basis of pure educational policy.
The other consideration that seemed especially weighty in the court's rejection of the validation claim entails a shift of emphasis from the EMR classes to the EMR label. Stressing the deep and harmful effect of being identified as a "retarded" person, the court concluded that validation in terms of the truthfulness of that identity, and not validation in terms of the EMR educational program, is what the state must establish. The court noted the flaw in using a medical model to conceptualize what it means to be retarded within educational contexts, but did not suggest how one might validate the state of being retarded other than through testing or educational performance.
So, in the Federal District of California, some 13 years after a case was initiated to correct an allegedly erroneous educational placement, the trial judge, having followed a labyrinthine path, concluded that the complaining students were unconstitutionally treated differently from other students. Specifically, he found that the discrimination on the basis of race was intentional and that that discrimination could not be justified.
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The Larry P. Appeal Before turning to the resulting court order and its relationship to the wrong complained of, two more turns of the kaleidoscope will help to spin out the long and fine line that connects the educational harm and the judicial response. First, the changes that occurred as a result of the appeal from the trial court to the appellate court-in this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit-should be noted. On the one issue that has been discussed in this context-the equal protection claim-the Ninth Circuit gave an ambiguous response. Although several state officials were defendants in the suit, only the California Superintendent of Public Instruction, Wilson Riles, appealed. The Ninth Circuit's opinion was carefully worded. Referring to "the theory that the pervasiveness of discriminatory effect can, without more, be equated with the discriminatory intent required," the court stated, "[W]e reject these facts of the trial court and reverse the conclusions "The finding of intentional race discrimination is a factual determination that sets in motion the legal question of whether that classification can be justified by the state. Except (perhaps) in affirmative action cases, the state's burden of justification in a race discrimination case is so heavy that the finding of race discrimination is usually tantamount to a conclusion of an equal protection violation.
that the Superintendent was guilty of intentional discrimination."
12 But, because the other defendants did not appeal, the appellate court did not discuss that issue in reference to them. Therefore, we do not know whether the court would have upheld Judge Peckham in reference to them.
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In this case, it was easy for the Court of Appeals to say little about the constitutional issue because it upheld Judge Peckham on the statutory grounds, and on that basis all of Judge Peckham's remedial order was upheld. Once again, one can see the gulf that can arise between the educational issue to be solved and the legal window of opportunity for solution. In this instance, as it happened, one legal window closed but another opened. At the preliminary injunction stage of Larry P., Judge Peckham relied entirely on the equal protection clause, and that legal basis was approved by the Court of Appeals. But the governing constitutional law doctrine changed before the permanent injunction phase of the case, and, under the new doctrine, Judge Peckham's decision was rejected-at least with regard to the California Superintendent of Public Instruction. If that was the only legal basis for solution, the same educational policy issue would have met a very different fate. Fortunately for the plaintiffs, other legal doctrines came into play during the interim as a result of new legislation or new interpretations of old legislation.
14 The details of these alternative legal sources were different (especially in a shifting of the burden of proof), though the basic disjunction between the educational grievance and the legal remedy followed the pattern of the equal protection clause (in relying on the racially discriminatory effect of testing rather than the wrongfulness of the EMR placement as such). Furthermore, because of the appellate nature of the proceeding, the Court of Appeals focused on the lower court decision rather than the educational decision that brought the case to court. The Ninth Circuit did not say directly that the plaintiffs had received an erroneous educational placement, nor even that it agreed with the lower court that the plaintiff's statutory rights had been violated. It said only that the district court's decision was not "clearly erroneous." Generally speaking, that is saying that the lower court was not entirely mistaken about the meaning of the law and, within the broad discretion permitted in applying the law to the facts of the case, had stayed within tolerable limits. It leaves open the possibility that, had the trial court, even on the very same record, come out the other way, the appellate court would have approved that as well.
A Parallel Case
The other turn of the kaleidoscope is quite different; it is looking at the same basic problem from the perspective of another federal district judge. A year after 12 793 F.2d at 984.
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Earlier in the opinion, after summarizing Judge Peckham's findings concerning the questionable circumstances in which the particular intelligence tests had been selected, the Court of Appeals said, "That finding thus stands as to the nonappealing defendants." 793 F.2d at 974. 14 The Education for All Handicapped Children Act (now the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act were enacted after the Larry P. preliminary injunction action; and subsequent to Judge Peckham's permanent decision but before the appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was adopted as a consequence of which an action based on the regulations under Title VI, though not Title VI itself, could rely on discriminatory effect without a showing of discriminatory purpose. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U. S. 582 (1983) . Judge Peckham's decision in California, a conclusion diametrically opposite to Larry P. was reached by Judge Grady in the case of Parents in Action on Special Education (PASE) v. Hannon, 15 brought by parents of children in Chicago. As in California, the category of special education for mildly retarded children (called "educable mentally handicapped," EMH, in Illinois) included a disproportionate number of Black children (82%) compared to their percentage of the Chicago public school enrollments (62%). The plaintiffs relied on the same legal arguments and the same testing experts as they had done in Larry P. As with the EMR classes in Larry P., EMH classes were designed for children who could not benefit from the regular curriculum. And as with Larry P., PASE was a class action, and the PASE plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction against the use of standardized intelligence tests to classify and place Black children in EMH classes.
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Judge Grady and Judge Peckham agreed in assuming that the EMR/EMH classes were beneficial to students properly assigned to them, despite the stigmatizing effect of the classification label, but that such classes were positively and seriously harmful to those erroneously assigned to them as a result of misclassification. Both judges agreed that intelligence tests measured something that was developed and changeable rather than a fixed, innate quality. They agreed about little else. Their differences embraced both opposing views on the same subject (though, of course, not clearly the same record evidence) and a selection of different subjects to emphasize.
Before turning to the opposing views reflected in their two opinions, a different sort of comparison should be noted. Judges are human, of course, and putting aside prejudices and preconceptions that they bring with them to any case, they also react to the issues and the cast of characters that come before them in the form of lawyers and witnesses who appear in the flesh or on the printed page of the material presented to the court. Although one can be reasonably confident that judges do respond in this human way from case to case, one can only speculate about how that has occurred in particular cases. From the Larry P. opinion, one gets the impression that Judge Peckham developed a strong dislike and distrust of the state officials because of the way they had rammed through the adoption of particular intelligence tests, seemingly contemptuous of other views and careless of the racial effect, because, as Judge Peckham assumed in his opinion more than once, they regarded Black children as a group to be intellectually inferior. One gets a very different impression from the PASE opinion. Judge Grady seems to have felt that the case was being brought into his courtroom as a kind of road show from California by the lawyers and experts who expected to roll effortlessly over the court. Judge Grady's opinion reveals his lack of respect for the lawyers and their expert witnesses in part because he found their arguments unconvincing and in part because he did not think they were well prepared to defend their position. One additional impression that comes through in both opinions is the judge's sense of his unique power and responsibility to judge. That personal dimension, too, contributes to the change that takes place when an educational policy issue moves into the judicial process for resolution.
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506 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. 111. 1980) . 16 But whereas the Larry P. class represented consisted only of Black children who had been or might be misclassified as EMR, the PASE class consisted of all Black children who were or might be assigned to EMH classes.
The different conclusions of the Larry P. and PASE courts seem most directly and clearly traceable to two striking differences in the opinions. Judge Peckham stressed the cavalier manner of adopting intelligence tests and ignoring their racial impact. There is no discussion whatsoever of the adoption and possible racial motives of the adopters in PASE. In Larry P., the inference of a racial motive drawn from the manner of the adoption of the tests was linked by the court to the fact that the developers of these tests early in the century were known to believe that low test performance by Black test takers resulted from the genetic inferiority of Black people. Although noting this historical strain of racist beliefs, the PASE court discounted its significance because no attempt was made by the plaintiffs to connect these beliefs with the current tests.
The second major difference between the two opinions was the radically different approach to the alleged cultural bias of the intelligence tests used. In both cases, the plaintiffs argued that the disparity of test results of Black and White children itself demonstrated that the tests were culturally biased. In light of the suspicious circumstances of the state's adoption of particular intelligence tests and the absence of any satisfactory explanation for the disparity of test results, the Larry P. court accepted the cultural bias explanation. The PASE court, in contrast, attached very little significance to the numbers showing substantial Black-White differences on test scores or EMH placement. Judge Grady insisted that one had to find cultural bias in the test items themselves. He undertook to examine every test item on three intelligence tests 17 used in the classification process to determine whether they revealed cultural bias against Black children. Thus, marching through 35 pages of the Federal Supplement, Judge Grady, in effect, asked the plaintiffs about every one of the hundreds of test items, item by item: "Where is the cultural bias in this item?" In this exercise, he noted the total absence of objection to most of the items, and he also noted the relatively few particular objections that had been raised and usually explained why he did not think the objection demonstrated racial or cultural bias. At the end of this excursion as a test evaluator, Judge Grady concluded that there were nine items that were "either racially biased or so subject to suspicion of bias that they should not be used." 18 Furthermore, he explained how the tests were scored and children classified on the basis of their scores, and he concluded that such a low total number of flawed items could have no general serious distorting effect of the test results of Black children as a group.
Understandably, Judge Grady has been criticized for his presumptuousness in judging what he is not qualified to judge. 19 Still, Judge Grady's analysis reflected a great deal of care and thoroughness. Plaintiffs' experts argued that the BlackWhite test result differential was a result of distinct Black and White cultures and experiences, but these experts were unable to explain the connection between this different experience and the test questions. No such explanatory connection was made in Larry P. because Judge Peckham did not engage in an item-by-item analysis of the test content for cultural bias. 1237,1280(1995). 20 In his discussion of the Larry P. treatment of the issue, Judge Grady noted that Judge Peckham Perhaps acknowledging that the inability to articulate the connection did not disprove the existence of cultural bias, Judge Grady concluded that the plaintiffs "have failed to prove their contention" that the tests were culturally unfair to Black children. Interpreting Section 1412(5) of the IDEA statute in a somewhat surprising way, 21 Judge Grady rejected the plaintiffs' legal argument that the burden of proof was on the defendants to prove that the tests were not culturally biased. Thus, in the assignment of the burden of proof, too, the Larry P. and PASE decisions were inconsistent.
But, if Judge Grady made too much of the content of test items in assigning the burden of proof, Judge Peckham made too much of the disproportionate test scores in doing so. Although the tests were standardized originally on an all-White sample, they were subsequently standardized on a sample that included representative numbers of blacks.
22 But, for Judge Peckham, that was not enough. He thought separate validation for Black and White students was required. 23 He relied heavily on the disproportionate test scores for his conclusion of cultural bias, and he seemed to assume that cultural bias indicated that the test was invalid. But, although a culturally biased test might well be invalid, it is not necessarily so.
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At least three other contrasts in the opinions further help to explain the different conclusions. First, the Larry P. court saw the decision to eliminate the group variation of test scores of boys and girls but not Blacks and Whites was based on the state officials' belief in accuracy of inferior Black performance, whereas the PASE court noted that a relatively minor adjustment eliminated the had focused on the legal consequences that flow from cultural bias, which was "hardly disputed" in that case. Judge Grady then summarized the entire extent of Larry P.'s discussion of test items:
Judge Peckham mentions the WISC "fight" item, finds that it is culturally biased against blacks and then remarks, "Similarly, it may be that such questions as who wrote Romeo and Juliet, who discovered America, and who invented the lightbulb, are culturally biased." Finally, Judge Peckham noted that "such skills as 'picture arrangement' may be tested in a biased fashion if the pictures, which generally are of Caucasian persons, relate to situations more typical of white, middle class, life than the experiences of many black children." 506 F. Supp. at 882.
21
The Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(C), required that a state, to receive federal funding for special education, "demonstrate it has established ... procedures to assure that testing and evaluation materials and procedures utilized for the purposes of evaluation and placement of handicapped children will be selected and administered so as not to be racially or culturally discriminatory.... [A] nd no single procedure shall be the sole criterion for ... [placement] ." Judge Grady read this provision to mean that "the process as a whole be non-discriminatory." 506 F. Supp. at 878. To take the most obvious example, if the test used for EMR placement is culturally biased and the regular educational program is similarly culturally biased, the test should accurately predict poor educational performance in the regular educational program. That phenomenon might argue for changes in the regular educational program (and not simply assigning students to EMR classes); but that is not the inevitable conclusion, and it is certainly a different problem from test invalidity. At one point, Judge Peckham contemplated that this phenomenon might accurately describe the Larry P. situation. 495 F. Supp. at 960.
gender differential, but a massive change of all test items would be required to eliminate the racial differential. Second, Larry P. rejected the socioeconomic explanation that attributed lower test scores of Black children to poor nutrition, whereas PASE credited a different socioeconomic explanation that attributed the low scores to the absence of cognitive stimulation.
25 Third, the Larry P. court treated the intelligence test scores as the dominant factor in determining EMR placement, whereas the PASE court elaborated the assessment process and concluded that the test scores were only one of many factors determining EMH placement.
This brief comparison of the Larry P. and PASE cases does not purport to demonstrate that one is right and the other wrong. It does demonstrate, however, the number of points at which the fate of an educational policy issue in court will turn on legal distinctions and legal judgments that are only obliquely or not at all relevant or important to achieving a desirable educational policy. In his conclusion, Judge Grady stated that, with proper administration, the evaluation "should rarely result in the misassessment" of children as retarded and "there is no evidence that such misassessments as do occur are the result of racial bias in test items or any other aspect of the assessment process." These are not meaningless observations, but they are tentative and guarded and they fall far short of a determination that Black children are receiving the educational program that best fits their educational needs.
V. Returning the Larry P. Case to the Educators
If going to court transforms an educational policy issue into a quite different legal issue, what sort of "detransformation" takes place when the court finds in favor of the party complaining about an educational decision? The best answer is probably that the detransformation is partial. It is essential to start with the judicial focus and the judicial conclusion, in our example, that the state has violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights by racial discrimination. What, precisely, could it mean-should it mean-for a court to order the state of California to cease the racial discrimination that had been found? To what extent would such an order remedy the complaints of the plaintiffs in this case that they had been wrongly assigned to EMR classes? To what extent might such an order go beyond what was asked?
Remedy
The actual injunctive relief ordered by Judge Peckham-and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on appeal and still in effect-reveals both the genius and the inherent limitations of courts in providing a judicial remedy for an educational grievance that is encompassed by a broad educational policy issue. The court divided its 25 Judge Grady thought that the location of Headstart programs in the inner city where many Black children lived supported a socioeconomic theory, but Judge Peckham thought that the beneficial effect on Black test scores of early intervention programs (as well as living in White communities or being raised by White parents) supported the cultural bias theory; but Judge Grady also thought a cultural bias explanation inconsistent with the fact that many Black children did well on the tests and only a small percentage were assigned to EMH. (Although Black children made up a disproportionate part of EMR classes, only a small percentage of all Black students (3.7%, compared to 1.3% of White students) were in EMR classes. injunction into three named sections: "intelligence tests," "disproportionate placement," and "reevaluation and other class relief."
Intelligence Tests
The court did prohibit the use of intelligence tests, but instead of doing so in sweeping, simple terms, the court's order qualified and limited the prohibition in various respects. First, the prohibition applied only to Black children, not an inevitable limitation. The court had found, in effect, that the equal protection clause was violated because the defendants intentionally used the test in order to get more Black children into EMR classes, where they did not belong-but not all or only Black children. To the extent that the flaw in the use of the test for Black children was based on "cultural bias," one might suppose that not all Black children were disadvantaged by this characteristic and that not all White children would be impervious to its effects. Indeed, drawing on the Hobson v. Hansen case, 26 Judge Peckham noted his skepticism about "the ability of I.Q. tests to measure a student's potential to master normal academic skills"; and then assumed these tests "are valid for measuring appropriate skills and potential for white middle-class children."
27 But the court did not identify the nature of the bias with any precision; so there was no way to say which Black (or White) children might be so affected.
Under the second limitation on the court's prohibition of the use of intelligence testing, the restriction applied only to the use of the tests for identification of children and their placement into the EMR category or a "substantially equivalent" category. The general limitation of the decree to EMR decisions was straightforward: That was what the case was all about, and the addition of the "substantially equivalent" language seems innocuous enough at first. But that seemingly innocuous extension revealed a hidden problem, which has proved to be the source of considerable difficulty. At the time the decree was issued, the court knew that California was considering the elimination of the EMR category. Understandably, the court did not want the substance of its order undermined by a change in name of a "dead end" educational placement for retarded children, a disproportionate number of which turned out to be Black. The problem was that there was no way for the court to anticipate what California would do and no way to know in advance just which educational programs would be regarded as "substantially equivalent." Indeed, making such a decision would itself entail a significant legal question, including not only a determination of which characteristics were critical to the Larry P. decision but also what other characteristics would lead the court to a comparable legal disposition for reasons similar but not identical to those involved in Larry P.
The court accepted the invitation of the plaintiffs to modify the decree in 1986, an action that the court came to rue in the Crawford litigation. Under this modification, which incorporated the parties' settlement agreement, the prohibition of the use of intelligence tests for evaluating and placing Black children was extended to cover any and all special education categories. Subsequently, in 1992, in Crawford v. Honig, 2% this prohibition was challenged in a suit brought by Black children who wanted intelligence tests to be used in connection with their classification as learning disabled (LD). Basing his decision on a due process theory, Judge Peckham concluded that the Crawford plaintiffs had not had a fair chance to participate and influence the modification proceeding. Judge Peckham vacated the modification and restored the original Larry P. decree and, at the same time, ordered a further proceeding "to determine the contemporary meaning of the 'substantially equivalent' language." The Crawford plaintiffs evidently wanted access to intelligence testing, because LD has been understood to identify a low performance in school that is inconsistent with a student's ability, and that has been traditionally determined by the discrepancy between in-school performance and intelligence test scores.
29 Yet, if intelligence tests are invalid for Black children, that invalidity should not depend on whether the tests are used for EMR or LD evaluation and placement.
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As a third limitation, the prohibition on the use of intelligence tests applied only to the use without the court's prior approval. The details of this limitation demonstrate how a court can control substantive results with procedural provisions and how it can acquire the control of educational expertise through the exercise of judicial power. The court's order specifies that its approval can be obtained only on the basis of a written request from a majority of the State Board of Education and then sets the conditions precedent for such a request. The request must state "whether" certain determinations have been made concerning the test's cultural bias, its validation, its future nondiscriminatory administration; the request must include evidence of test scores and validation by race; the request must be under oath; the request must follow open hearings. Not only does this set of requirements put the court in the position of having substantial information on which to base a subsequent decision, but it inhibits the state actors from making a request without being prepared to make the strong showing likely to convince the court to approve. In fact, California discontinued the use of intelligence tests for any children for EMR evaluation and placement purposes before Judge Peckham issued his decision and order.
Disproportionate Placement
In contrast with the treatment of intelligence tests (where the court begins with a broad prohibition subject to change based on future evidence), the court's order concerning disproportionate assignment of Black children to the EMR classes affirmatively orders the collection of evidence, on the basis of which "the court after hearing may order such further relief as it deems appropriate." Despite the court's extremely negative characterization of the "dead end" EMR category throughout its opinion, the category is not eliminated. Furthermore, although the court's order begins by stating that the defendants "are hereby ordered to monitor and eliminate the disproportionate placement of black children in California's EMR classes," the emphasis is on monitoring rather than eliminating. Data 28 1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13677 (N.D. Calif. 1992 ), affirmed, 37 F.3d 485 (9th Cir. 1994 ).
29
B«f see authorities cited supra note 3.
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In affirming the trial court's Crawford decision, the Ninth Circuit said, "We have not decided the underlying issues"-the propriety of using intelligence tests for non-EMR special education purposes and "the arguments that the racist problems with I.Q. tests have been eliminated."
concerning Black and White children in total enrollment, classified as EMR, and placed in EMR classes are to be reported to various parties and the court. The decree does require a plan to "correct imbalances" and to specify "measures that will be adopted for reducing disparity" over a 3-year period; and it requires the defendants to notify the court of any disparity "of one standard deviation" at the end of 3 years. In these respects, the decree arguably outruns its legal justification by restricting disproportions not produced by the use of intelligence tests that violate the equal protection clause. 31 On the other hand, despite all of Judge Peckham's harsh comments about the inferior, stigmatizing, dead-end EMR program, the court's injunction left many White and Black children in EMR classrooms, contemplated a disproportionate number of EMR Black children as long as the disproportion does not exceed one standard deviation, and committed itself to no action even if the disproportion was greater-which brings us to the third category of the court's remedial action.
Re-evaluation and Other Class Relief
The court's decision clearly assumed that a substantial number of Black children had been incorrectly placed in EMR classes and were being harmed by that action. One would have expected that those children would have been immediately entitled to reclassification and replacement-except for one major stumbling block. The court had no idea which children those were.
32 So, once again, the court had to depend on the educational decision makers to reevaluate children who may "have been misidentified as EMR pupils." The court could order the educational decision makers to do so and could circumscribe their evaluation (by eschewing intelligence tests and by requiring the use of other techniques or information-diagnostic tests designed to reveal specific learning needs, adaptive behavior observation, child's developmental and health histories) and could order a return to regular classrooms with supplemental assistance of children found to have been misdiagnosed. But the actual evaluation-the judgment of an erroneous diagnosis, the determination of what supplementary assistance is needed-must be done by the educators.
Relief Denied
The plaintiffs requested but the court denied an order mandating supplemental assistance to "black disadvantaged children who are now in regular classes." The court acknowledged the inadequacy of the education being provided to a "vast number of minority and disadvantaged students." Of course, many of the children who were tested and placed in EMR classes and might now be headed back to regular classrooms had been identified for testing and special education treatment in the first place because regular education was not working for them. But, the court said, those who had never left the regular classrooms were "not before the 3 'The dissenting judge on the Ninth Circuit objected to this part of the decree because of its lack of legal authority and because it would force California to adopt a racial quota and thus to exclude Black children who should have an EMR placement (or possibly to assign White children who should not). Professor MacMillan discusses post-Larry P. actions by California educators who under-assign Black children in just this way. See MacMillan, supra note 4.
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The court did expressly find that the named plaintiffs had been misclassified and misplaced, but it gave no explanation of the reasoning that led it to this conclusion. court" and, therefore, the court could not "reach out" and order the "massive expenditure of funds" requested.
Evidently treating the EMR label itself as harmful, the plaintiffs also requested a judicial order eliminating erroneous EMR classifications of children who were not assigned to EMR classes. Although one would assume from Judge Peckham's entire opinion that he would not be unsympathetic with this request, his denial stressed that the testing problems "resulted largely from the particular nature of the E.M.R. classes" and concluded that "we know very little" about mainstreamed EMR students.
33

VI. Conclusion
Because Larry P. can be seen as an individual grievant coming to court for justice or as a public policy problem coming to court for solution, one must ask whether the grievant received justice and whether the problem was solved. Surely the answer is qualified in both instances.
The named plaintiffs received a decision saying that they had been misclassified and ordering them to be placed in a regular class with supplementary assistance. Whether that will be truly beneficial will depend on many things: the correctness of the court-ordered correcting classification, the quality of the supplementary assistance, the quality and appropriateness to the plaintiff individually of the regular classroom education, and, especially, just how bad the EMR program was from which the named plaintiff was escaping. The worse the EMR program, the easier it is to conclude that the named plaintiffs cannot have been made worse off by winning in court. At least the named plaintiffs got what they asked for, and that is not nothing. Yet what they asked for was a return to regular classrooms where their lack of educational accomplishment started them on their course to EMR in the first place.
For the unnamed plaintiffs (who were represented by reason of being members of the "class" of Black children who have been or will be wrongly placed in EMR classes), all of the variables already mentioned apply for any student who is reclassified and reassigned. In addition, there was the big question for all Black students assigned to EMR classes at the time Judge Peckham issued his Larry P. decree: whether the court-ordered reevaluation will result in reclassification and reassignment. Although intelligence tests may not be used in the reevaluation, there is no guarantee that the new evaluation will be more accurate than the old.
34
As a matter of educational policy, the same answers and uncertainties appear at a more general level. Intelligence testing evidently contributed to racial overrepresentation in EMR classes, but the court's decree will not eliminate, though it will reduce, overrepresentation. As we have just seen, evaluations without intelligence testing may but need not be more accurate. And even more accurate evaluations will not go very far in improving the quality of education for Black children unless it is accompanied by educational programs of quality well suited to the students' educational needs. As Judge Peckham well understood, students taken out of EMR 33 495F. Supp.at991.
M
Judge Peckham believed that the intelligence tests and achievement tests autocorrelate, and he noted that the alternative methods of evaluation "have apparently not been validated" and "are still producing intolerable disproportions." 495 F. Supp. at 974. might be worse off "in the absence of [other] effective remedial education." 35 It is possible that there is a gestalt effect of decisions such as Larry P. that, beyond anything expressly ordered in the court's decree, pushes the educational policy makers in the direction of more careful evaluation and more individualized educational programming.
In a conclusion to his opinion, Judge Peckham issued a postscript in which he talks about what he did, why he did it, and what effect it may have. This conclusion intertwines comments suggesting that positive educational change is taking place independent of the court's action in Larry P. but also suggesting that such change has resulted or may result from the Larry P. decision and judicial decree. It is a curious mixture of hope and skepticism, pride of accomplishment and acknowledged limitation of influence. The court was "forced to intervene," he says, because educators were not responding adequately or swifty enough to alleviate serious harm being done to "underprivileged minorities such as the black children who brought this lawsuit." When he criticizes California's "failure to provide an adequate education," he does not seem to mean only the education provided in EMR classes; and when he talks disparagingly about EMR classes, he seems not to be thinking exclusively of Black children. He explains that, despite "prodding" from the Larry P. preliminary order, the state defendants were unwilling to remedy the problems of EMR classification. Yet, even as he said they may be "educational anachronisms," he did not eliminate these EMR classes. By the time of Judge Peckham's opinion, EMR enrollments had dropped to fewer than one half their number 10 years earlier, and subsequent to Judge Peckham's decree, California dropped this designation entirely. Judge Peckham stated hopefully, "Change is taking place," but he also stated, more wishfully, that California's educators must confront their "widespread failure." "The movement is away from labeling and isolation and toward education to meet individual needs" in regular classes. In Judge Peckham's last words in his Larry P. opinion, he asserted that it was the court that refused to permit an unvalidated assumption of intellectual inferiority, "and it is hoped this [refusal] will clear the way for more constructive educational reform."
The particular Larry P. results were not preordained by issues, facts, arguments, advocacy, record, or institutional characteristics of the judiciary, though all of these factors are always in operation and having their effect. The mixed and still uncertain effects of the Larry P. litigation is what should be expected by an optimistic person who decides to take an educational or other public policy issue of some complexity to court. There will, inevitably, be a transformation from its educational origin to make it fit available legal concepts. It is not quite inevitable but very likely that the court will feel constrained in this way in judging the educational policy issue. It is quite possible, though, and maybe even likely, that the court will to some extent break the bounds of its own legal conceptualization by reason of its seeing and feeling the educational issue in its own educational terms. Thus, in this case, the court did not enjoin the use of EMR classes, because the legality of those classes was not part of the legal case before the court. At the same time, the court's reasoning, right or wrong, was plainly influenced by its strong negative judgment of stigmatizing, inferior, dead-end EMR classes. 35 495 F. Supp. at 988.
